In 2001, because of my studies at the US Army War College, I was given the opportunity to better understand the US policy as far as Europe is concerned. Therefore, I offer this SRP based on the unique perspective I have gained from service in the SHAPE, and in the US Army War College as well as the deep friendships I have established with officers I met there.
I would like to acknowledge a number of people who assisted me in developing my thoughts and provided me key resources for this SRP but first and foremost, among others, is COL Edward Murdock, my research advisor. I remain eternally grateful and indebted for his support, patience and understanding during the preparation of this paper.
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THE RENEWED UNITED-STATES DEFENSE POLICY: IMPLICATIONS ON THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
To precisely define the determinants of the American Defense Policy is a tremendous challenge because the setting up of the new Administration has been a lengthy business and the new terrorist threats has forced a reorientation of previous priorities. Nevertheless, first official declarations 1 This essay begins an examination of this very important subject. President Bush presented his priorities 5 : reinforcement of trust and confidence with the American armed forces; improvement of the capacities required to fight terrorism; protection of space assets and information systems and development of an Antiballistic Missile Defense capability. Overall, he wants the United-States to build a military tool adapted to the challenges of the XXI century that will take into account the ongoing technological revolution and the new geopolitical environment mainly characterized by asymmetrical threats. The U.S. defense strategy will embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise. This strategy is premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home. Therefore, the new American Defense Policy will be characterized by an important technological sophistication and by a continued unilateral approach in defense policy. This will likely have important effects on the relationship of the United States with European allies.
THE U.S. DEFENSE POLICY AS DEFINED BY THE QDR 20016
The QDR 2001 provides strategy and direction for DOD. It has been issued prior to the definition of a National Defense Strategy on September 30, 2001. The QDR was not written in a vacuum, it reflects views of the President, the NSC and many outsiders. It expresses the interests and goals of the U.S. as a nation.
The definition of programs and budgets needed to implement this strategy is expected to follow. This strategy underlines seven key themes 7 :: -Surprise and uncertainty -highlights the condition of planning, -Asymmetrical threats, -Deterrence -refashion existing concepts, adopting a multi-faceted approach.
Forward deterrence based on forward force posture (deployments) plus capabilities for immediate reinforcement, -Homeland Defense, -Transforming defense: identified a set of operational challenges and four focused areas, -Force sizing: paradigm shift in force planning to a capabilities approach, -Risk: new risk assessment framework.
The United States has entered the 21st century as the preeminent military, economic, and political power in the world. U.S. security in the 218t century is described as the result of its unique role in the world, because it is already the only superpower with a global foreign policy. Its goals remain essentially the same when compared to those described in QDR 1997; to promote peace; to sustain freedom; and to encourage prosperity. Its unique security role provides the basis for a network of alliances and friendships. The U.S. will provide stability and confidence to its allies and friends and will guarantee them against coercion and aggression. With the exception of the Balkans, Europe is considered largely at peace. Central European states are becoming increasingly integrated with the West, both politically and economically and therefore don't pose a large scale conventional military threat to NATO.
Europe is seen as sharing the common threat of ballistic missile attacks. This will allow a reorientation of the U.S. military global posture, in the near future, as the U.S. overseas presence remains aligned closely with its own interests and likely threats to those interests. The U.S. presence in Western Europe may decrease. The primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create a favorable balance of power in critical areas of the world. This balance of power as far as Europe is concerned, should be understood as a balance of power among European countries. The bottom line is the U.S. will not support the emergence of a strong political and military Europe as a peer competitor. A renewed relationship should lead at the very least to a partnership.
KEY MILITARY-TECHNICAL TRENDS:
-Rapid advancement of military technologies, -Increasing proliferation of CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles, -Emergence of new arenas of military competition: space and cyber space, -Increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.
The answer to problems these trends pose is the improvement of substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of military competition (e.g., power projection, space and information). It will require exploiting U.S. advantages in superior technological innovation and increasing these advantages especially in the C41SR 9 . These improvements will maintain U.S. leadership even within coalition operations, but will weaken the efficiency of such a coalition force. Consequently, it will be difficult to strengthen alliances and partnerships on military bases. U.S. forces won't be able to enhance interoperability 1°.
The motto of the Defense Strategy shifts from the trilogy "Shape-Respond-Prepare" to a new quadrilogy consisting in "Assure allies and friends-Dissuade future military competitionDeter threats and coercion against U.S. interests-if deterrence fails, decisively Defeat any adversary." Therefore the force sizing construct is based on four capabilities:
-Defend the United States, 
STRONG POINTS AND WEAK POINTS OF THE QDR 2001.
The analysis of the strong and weak points of this report make it possible to highlight the relevance of the strategic synthesis presented by QDR 2001 within the framework of the approach of U.S. foreign commitment: a fine and strong structured strategic synthesis. It presents differences from predecessors. The use of outside panels during the drafting process created expectations for radical changes. The product is mostly a strategy document without any programmatic details or guidance for resource allocation. Strategy analysts will have to wait for the other shoe to drop.
Even Pentagon officials who were deeply involved in the drafting of the previous QDR report recognize that there are many good things in this 2001 document as far as the defense of U.S. specific interests is concerned.
First, the document does not disregard the past. Pentagon officials should not have conceived it this way, but they rather regard it as a new stage in adapting the strategy of defense to the post Cold War era rather than a new strategic rupture. The most positive aspect of this document resides in the emphasis it places on asymmetrical threats. Before September 11, asymmetrical threats were already an important consideration. It was a known topic but still a future concern. But today, these are a reality and thus credible. Americans confront with asymmetric warfare can believe in it after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush Administration has understood perfectly the criticality of these threats as a key factor in determining the strategic thought.
In the same way, these threats place at its right level the defense of the territory. Already, before September 11, the defense of U.S. territory was articulated as a major mission of the active and reserve armed forces, and the National Guard. Today this focus on Homeland Defense is so important it becomes a significant criterion for designing and organizing forces.
Another positive element of QDR 2001, is the preservation of the transformation of forces in priorities of the Pentagon: U.S. forces need to transform to take up the challenges of the 2 1 st century. The CJCS Assessment has a cautionary tone and balances transformation with near and mid-term commitments. It is interesting to note on this subject that collaborators of Mr.
Rumsfeld are already preparing a follow-on step by defining a half dozen operational goals to provide Pentagon officials with directives to select and define programs needed to implement the defense strategy. Those will guide efforts for transformation. They should direct projects of development and experimentation.
This report has also the merit of widening the major force sizing criterion of U.S. forces, namely the capacity to conduct almost simultaneously two major conflicts (Major Theater of War or MTW). Force sizing is based on a capabilities-based approach. The capacity to commit and to overcome on 2 MTW was the double criterion to design U.S. conventional forces (with the exception of naval forces which already integrated the need of a presence on all seas). In theory, it is a powerful criterion. But the illustrative nature of scenarios which U.S. forces used, namely a war against Iraq and Korea, had been forgotten. Pentagon officials had then passed from the preparation to two generic scenarios to the preparation of forces to two specific cases.
And in a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous, or VUCA world, that was particularly dangerous.
Thus, it was necessary that U.S. officials re-examine their criterion of force sizing and their ways to commit such forces. It was significant to generalize this kind of scenario used to plan architecture of forces, while trying to limit uncertainty. It was necessary to study performances of forces vis-ý-vis a broader variety of scenarios or combinations of scenarios to develop a real capacity vis-6-vis a large spectrum of possible scenarios. The new Administration took this problem into account.
Crises of low intensity (Small Scale Contingencies or SSC) could be conducted simultaneously. The initial desire of the Bush Administration was to set aside these missions and, for example, even considered the withdrawal of American troops from the Balkans. But in the months which followed, the new U.S. authorities realized that this was easier to say than to do. And perhaps the former Administration had good reasons to commit U.S. forces in these operations, and that those SSCs could not and should not to be regarded as secondary. Thus, The third weakness is the absence of transparency concerning analysis that precedes the conclusion. In the two previous reports, QDR 93 and 97, the drafters were able to reveal the essence of their analysis, even in these unclassified documents. In QDR 2001, we do not know details of the analysis. It is a weakness because it will be more difficult to defend this document before the Congress. If there is one thing in which members of commissions of Congress excel, it is in the scrupulous examination of reasons why decisions were taken by the Department of Defense. It would be less difficult to obtain approval of a project by anticipating this attitude rather than to react step by step in answering each one of their questions in public hearings.
Moreover, the report doesn't answer the legislative requirements. Because of the absence of the NSS, the Bush Administration lost an opportunity to complete the process correctly. As far as force structure is concerned, it will be necessary to complete a "ground-up" look at requirements.
But the major weakness of this report is in the absence of an accurate vision of the implications of globalization on the U.S. Defense Strategy. The corollary of this policy would be the emergence of a new balance of power as far as nuclear deterrence is concerned 15 . Therefore a renewed strategic framework should be shaped.
This project could be accompanied by an effort to ensure U.S. supremacy in space capabilities and could lead to the acquisition of a monopoly in this domain. This is another threat in the balance of power in the 2 1 st century. Lastly, the "American Missile Shield16" proposal is already a tremendous rhetoric device to check the loyalty of the European allies.
REVOLUTION IN THE MILITARY?
This He is well-armed to energize and direct significant changes in the U.S. military. Two extreme positions historically clashed as regards European defense, which return to two contradictory designs of Community construction. On a side, the successive French governments defended with constancy "Europe power" -or "European Europe", to repeat the "de Gaulle" terminology -, which is defined by strong common policies and independence with regard to the United States. In this meaning, the WEU had responsibility to become the "military arm" of the E.U. for its Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP, independent of NATO.
On the other side, traditionally the British position, Europe is reduced to its free-trader dimension, and the United States is de facto a member. The E.U. is not seen as a community but as a large market connected by a transatlantic economic partnership, and being fully satisfied by its subordinate statute within NATO. A CFSP does not mean a European defense and a European defense does not imply necessarily a European army.
The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam reflect these two approaches by ambiguous formulations endeavoring to say one thing and its opposite, to propose the WEU but proclaiming, each time as necessary, its compatibility with NATO: "the foreign and common security policies include the broad spectrum of questions relating to the security of the European Union, including the definition, in the long term, of a policy of common defense, which could lead, at the proper time, to a common defense" (Article J 4-1 of E.U. Treaty). In fact, except
France and, to a certain extent, Spain -(Germany now being tempted to play its national card independently of the Union) -, no country, among the Fifteen, wanted a "Europe Power", not even as a pillar of NATO. with the headline goal established in Helsinki, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks, but that certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms in order to maximize the capabilities available to the Union. In this respect, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment fully to achieve the goals identified at the Helsinki European Council. To that end, they will aim to identify as soon as possible the complementary initiatives which they may implement, either on a national basis or in cooperation with partners, to respond to the needs identified. These efforts will be in addition to the contributions already identified. For the countries concerned, these efforts and those deployed as part of the initiative on NATO defense capabilities are mutually reinforcing.
In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member States32 make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in Helsinki (60,000 troops available for deployment within 60 days for a mission of at least a year). These contributions, set out in the "Force Catalogue", constitute a pool of more than 100,000 soldiers and approximately 400 combat aircrafts and 100 ships, making it possible to satisfy fully the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis-management missions within the headline goal.
By 2003, once the appropriate European Union political and military bodies are in a position to ensure political control and strategic management of E.U.-led operations, under the authority of the Council, the Union will gradually be able to undertake Petersberg tasks 33 in line with its increasing military capabilities. The need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has however been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied. Efforts also need to be made in specific areas such as military equipment, including weapons and munitions, support services, including medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of forces.
As regards command, control and communications, the Member States offered a satisfactory number of national or multinational military staff at strategic and operational levels34, and in terms of forces and components. These offers will have to be evaluated further in qualitative terms so that the E.U. can, over and above possible recourse to NATO capabilities, have the best possible command and control resources at its disposal. The Union pointed out the importance it attaches to the speedy conclusion of ongoing talks on access to NATO capabilities and resources. The European Union Military Staff, which has acquired an initial operational capability in the course of 2001, will bolster the European Union's collective early warning capability and will provide it with a pre-decisional situation assessment and strategic planning capability.
As far as intelligence is concerned, apart from the image interpretation capabilities of the Torrejon Satellite Center, Member States offered a number of resources which can contribute to the analysis and situation monitoring capability of the European Union. Nevertheless, they noted that serious efforts would be necessary in this area in order for the Union to have more strategic intelligence at its disposal in the future.
With regard to the strategic air and naval transport capabilities available to the European Union, improvements are necessary to guarantee that the Union is able to respond, in any scenario, to the requirements of a demanding operation at the top of the Petersberg range, as defined in Helsinki.
In accordance with the decisions of the Helsinki and Feira European Councils 35 on collective capability goals, the Member States also committed themselves to medium and longterm efforts in order to improve both their operational and their strategic capabilities still further.
The Member States committed themselves, particularly in the framework of the reforms being implemented in their armed forces, to continue taking steps to strengthen their own capabilities and carrying out existing or planned projects implementing multilateral solutions, including in the field of pooling resources.
The restructuring of the European defense industries taking place in certain Member
States was a positive factor in this. It encouraged the development of European capabilities. By way of example, the Member States concerned cited the work they are engaged in on a number of vital projects which would contribute to bolstering the capabilities at the Union's disposal:
Future Large Aircraft (Airbus A 400M), sea transport vessels, Troop Transport Helicopters (NH 90). Some Member States also announced their intention to continue their efforts to acquire equipment to improve the safety and effectiveness of military action (for example counter battery radars). Some undertook to improve the Union's guaranteed access to satellite imaging, thanks in particular to the development of new optical and radar satellite equipment (Helios II,
SAR Lupe and Cosmos Skymed).
In order to ensure the durability of European action to strengthen capabilities, the Member
States agreed on the importance of laying down an evaluation mechanism enabling follow-up to be made and progress to be facilitated toward the realization of the commitments made with a view to achieving the headline goal, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.
The purpose of this mechanism, the broad outline of which was approved at the Nice European Council36, was to provide the Union with an assessment and follow-up capability for its goals (based on the HTF -Headline Goal Task Force) relying on a consultation method between the Member States. In order to avoid needless duplication, it could, for the Member 
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The U.S. approach is still ambiguous and even seems suspicious because the Bush Administration wants to avoid to the United States facing a peer competitor in a long term future.
Europe is already a peer economic competitor for the U.S. and the competition will increase in a near future due to the capitalization of European industrial companies. Stanley Loan issued an excellent study 3 ,, in which he demonstrated that a politically and military strong Europe is seen as a challenge. Turkey, frustrated by E.U. accession process is resisting pressure from U.S officials to accept the Berlin Principles which allow E.U access to NATO planning resources.
These principles issued at the Washington NATO summit on April 1999, define automatic decision-making processes addressing Alliance support to an E.U. concerns about NATO could be seen as based on its own national interests and the effective influence on European defense policy NATO organization provides.
The Three D (no Decoupling, no Duplication, no Discrimination) used a short while ago by
Mrs. Albright were perceived as the three Nos by some European officials. It is another example of the conservative approach some U.S. officials use to monitor the development of the E.U defense policy and to keep it as one of the pillars of the NATO temple. Lord Robertson substituted the three Is (Inclusiveness, Improvement, Indivisibility) for the three Ds as a more politically correct way to express the same statement.
The E.U. bloc in NATO exists today. Some members suggest that the same motivation inspired the proposal that 6 non-E.U. members of NATO become favored interlocutors since they would not be involved in the decision-making process of an E.U.-led operation. They will only participate in crisis situation analysis, and their involvement in military management will depend on their significant commitment of forces.
Another attitude of mistrust consists in repeatedly asserting that the E.U. should only deal with OOTWs, Smaller Scale Contingencies of the Petersberg Declaration. This contradicts the Cologne and Helsinki resolutions. Moreover the U.K-French Saint Malo summit decisions will require a tremendous change of approach of either the U.S. Administration or some NATO members. A framework that considers European countries as "vassals", 39 will be a key issue of the U.S. and E.U. relationship. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks could provide an opportunity for such a required change.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS
The devastating attacks against the United States have forced a major foreign policy shift by the Bush Administration, from a go-it-alone approach based on narrow U.S. interests to the pursuit of a global coalition against terrorism. The shift has been welcomed in European capitals. But even as the world's governments line up to pledge support for the United States, some worry that George W. Bush may not prove as adroit as his father was in forging an international coalition in 1990, after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. There is fear that President
Bush may overreact militarily, striking back so hard against elusive terrorist targets that the Arab world becomes radicalized and spawns more terrorism.
Almost from the day he entered the White House, president Bush drew criticism from some U.S. allies for his rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and his vow to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to construct a missile defense system -moves that were regarded abroad as signifying an American retreat into a fortress mentality.
Have the Americans become multilateralists since the attacks of September 11 ? There is no evidence to support this. The U.S. Senate always had very firm positions against any new engagement of the United States in a multilateral system which undermines U.S. sovereignty.
That did not change.
But the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, and the anthrax bio terrorism shattered any illusions that the United States could transform itself into an invulnerable haven.
As former president George H.W. Bush observed in a speech in Boston on September 13, the surprise attacks should "erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism, or in anything else for that matter."
European capitals felt quiet satisfaction at the recognition by the world's only superpower that it still requires the support of friends and former foes in the battle against terrorism and to achieve other foreign policy goals. Some officials say the Bush administration, fearing isolation on global warming and other issues, was already moving toward a more cooperative attitude, and the trauma of September 11 destroyed any lingering sense of self-sufficiency.
"It was only a matter of time," said a senior adviser to French President Jacques Chirac. between the Western and Islamic worlds, which he claimed "may be among the demented calculations of those who instigated the attacks" in New York and Washington. He suggested that measures designed to sabotage the financial and logistical networks that nourish terrorism could be much more effective than massive bombing raids that endanger innocent civilians.
In Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair has joined Bush in calling for a global campaign "to find all of the perpetrators of the suicide attacks and destroy their machinery of terror," the government has appealed for the United States to deliberate before launching a retaliatory attack and dragging its allies into war. "Article 5 does not mean a blank check," said a Blair spokesman.
NATO diplomats said that despite the show of solidarity, the United States was likely to act alone or lead a core "coalition of the willing" when the time comes for a military response.
But there was little doubt that the NATO alliance, just like the United States, has been dramatically affected by the bombings. Acting side by side, the U.S. and the Europeans faced and overcame these crises. The large quantities of weapons needed for the Cold War were losing their justification, hence the decline in U.S. and European defense spending, which was broadly parallel. But the U.S. kept, in comparative terms, a higher level of spending, especially on research and development, which enabled it to introduce new weapons and systems. Some European nations, France being one of them, looked to modernize but the result of this collective effort was disappointing.
Three emerging trends are now evident:
First, on both sides of the Atlantic, countries are reassessing some of their security risks and threats. These reassessments involve wide-ranging political and strategic assumptions and deserve an open public debate.
Second, some of their major existing systems need to be replaced. These large procurement programs will raise issues about the new capabilities and systems of forces which fit best into their vision of the threats, and on the level of expenditure democracies will want to devote to defense.
Third, dynamic economic sectors are competing hard for the basic resources their military establishments need, that is to say people. And above all, capable, technically competent people are in demand.
Leaders are working hard to find the best answers to these challenges, on both sides of the Atlantic. There is an additional factor to manage -the reciprocal impact of decisions to be taken on both sides of the Atlantic. This delicate period should also be one of intense dialogue and serious thought about how allies can best act in a coherent and complementary way between the U.S. and Europe. This will not be easy because their perspectives and priorities will not necessarily be identical. The Europeans will have their own answers and priorities, just as the United States as a global power will have its answers and priorities. In reviewing the difficulties, some solutions surface. Proliferation reflects, at least in part, the temptation of states confronted with economic and social problems to compensate for domestic paralysis by shows of outward assertiveness.
There is no dispute either in France4° or in the rest of Europe about the real dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. European countries welcome a real and constructive debate on the subject of proliferation and, on all the responses to it, including missile defense. They will participate actively in it.
But proliferation, while a real problem, is not high on the priority list in European public opinion. European citizens are, however, keenly aware of the human rights violations, instabilities, waves of illegal immigration, trafficking and global crime that surround them and reach them on a daily basis. They increasingly expect their governments to be able to act on those clear and present challenges.
These concerns tend to be reflected in European priorities as they have emerged in the past months. When the E.U. members determined the tools they needed to handle problems directly relevant to them, they naturally started from their Balkan experience. Their priority is the development of rapidly deployable conventional forces that could intervene to put out the fires in their backyard or further afield. Alongside the military requirement, the E.U. is developing its civilian capabilities for nation building.
At the end of 2001, E.U. heads of state and government declared the E.U.'s operational capability which will enable the E.U. to respond to some of the lesser contingencies that may arise. It will take some more time, and the investment in the necessary projection and other key capabilities, before the E.U. will be ready to address the broader set of missions in the framework of the Petersberg tasks.
Europeans recognize the strength of some American comments: the seriousness of their intentions will be judged by the reality of new capabilities. They will have to increase European capabilities for action on the higher end of the spectrum, capabilities that are available today only to a few E.U. Member States. Experience shows that the European Headline Goal is bringing more determination for many governments to improve their defense spending both in volume and in capacity to combine national efforts; and this is going to benefit NATO capabilities as the Alliance has long demanded.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The risk that the present period of reassessment might lead to transatlantic differences was already mentioned. Does the development of a European reaction force create the very situation both sides of the Atlantic want to avoid? Does it open the way for a division of labor with the U.S. taking care of the high end of the risk and conflict spectrum, and the Europeans focusing on the fire brigade function of local peace restoration in their vicinity?
Such a division of labor, whether intended or accidental, would damage transatlantic relations and reduce our overall capacity to deter and manage new crises. A key objective for this period of review the U.S. and Europe are going through is to avoid going down separate specialized paths and to come out of this process with trans-Atlantic solidarity preserved and enhanced. How can they do this?
First, both sides of the Atlantic Alliance must maintain their commitment to deterrence 41 .
Effective missile defenses are not going to come overnight. They require a prolonged process of technological innovation, investment, adjustment in existing arms control agreements and substantial co-ordination between the U.S. and its allies. But it is crucial that allied forces be interoperable if they are to remain capable of acting together. When choosing the format and contents of future U.S. forces, the U.S. must bear in mind that it will participate in coalitions with forces that will not always have the same level of technology, but which will have an equal determination to prevail over common challenges.
QDR 2001 addresses this issue without due consideration. Complementarity should be a key word for the U.S. and Europe partnership. Leaders must therefore build into their forces interfaces and bridges that allow them to work together effectively.
Leaders are at a key point in their decision cycles. As they consider their investment strategies about systems which are usually fielded for twenty years or more, they have to take care to avoid divergence. Leaders have to build convergence into their decisions. Technological and industrial factors must also be taken into account. They need to improve the sharing of technologies across the Atlantic, in an effective two way flow. This means: -searching for efficiency in procurement and access to technology; -implementing two-way confidence, while taking into account security and political concerns of both sides; -achieving real reciprocity in access to markets and technology.
European countries, spurred by industry, have achieved some dramatic improvements.
They have started to design a harmonized legal framework for enhancing transnational industrial activities and they have created a modem instrument for common program management. Other initiatives will also create conditions for an enhanced and balanced transatlantic cooperation. As these processes evolve, such experiments as the Raytheon/Thales co-operation will play a major role in European assessment of what can be achieved with the U.S.
A final suggestion on how to maintain coherence at this pivotal time, is to preserve TransAtlantic joint determination. Europeans are ready to contribute seriously to the management of future security risks. They will not create the conditions for a decoupling in the transatlantic security relationship. At the same time, the Europeans have a new-found determination to take political responsibility for the management of crises that affect their security. This is a critical development. It has taken a long time -too long perhaps. But it is a direct response to the longstanding U.S. expectation of burden sharing and is based on a recognition of the role of effective capabilities as well as on the political responsibility of the E.U., which is a political entity in development and no longer a mere common market.
There is a lot of work to be done on both sides but some real progress has already been France is ready to assume, whether on its own or in cooperation with allies or partners.
The important point is that each side of the transatlantic partnership is capable of shouldering its part of the problems and is ready to act in close harmony with the other. This is exactly what was done in the Kosovo crisis, and what is occurring now in Macedonia. The close co-operation between the E.U. and NATO, particularly the joint efforts of Javier Solana and Lord
Robertson is an example of what pragmatic, action-oriented co-operation can achieve. E.U. and U.S. joint determination in Macedonia has already had a positive effect because of the containment of the crisis. Moreover, in its way, the Macedonian crisis shows clearly the advantage of a European capability. By September 2003, E.U. is planned to take the lead of NATO operation in Macedonia. E.U. will be able to coordinate with more efficiency all aspects of a crisis using diplomacy, economy, information and military powers. This is a strong advantage because of "unity of command provided" and given NATO role limitation to defense issues. So the European Rapid Reaction Force is a practical response to a real need, for both sides of the Atlantic. It requires, and must deliver, real improvements in European capability. It includes the welcomed contributions of European allies who are not members of the E.U. And there is no intention of creating a division between European allies by creating an exclusive E.U. capability. E.U. has done everything necessary to associate her non-E.U. colleagues with the European Rapid Reaction Force. The transatlantic partnership is being renewed. It is changing. It will enlarge further. The next NATO summit in Prague could be a good opportunity to move the process forward.
CONCLUSION
The Trans-Atlantic alliance is facing the most uncertain geopolitical environment in half a. Preparing for the security challenges of the coming decades will require intellectual and political determination. The U.S. and Europe should help each other in analyzing all the aspects of these challenges in order to convince and mobilize democratic societies which will tend naturally to avoid multiple commitments in remote conflicts.
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